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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Margaret Lewis entered into a conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under the 
influence, specifically reserving the right to challenge, on appeal, the district court's 
denial of her motion to suppress the State's evidence in her case. Ms. Lewis' sole 
challenge regarding her motion to suppress was limited to whether there was 
reasonable, articulable suspicion to support the initial traffic stop, which was justified by 
the State on the grounds that the officer who pulled Ms. Lewis over observed her 
vehicle cross onto or over the fog line on the roadway several times. Mindful of the fact 
that crossing onto or over the fog line on a roadway constitutes a traffic offense, 
Ms. Lewis nevertheless asserts that the district court erred when it denied her motion to 
suppress. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Margaret Lewis was charged with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.35-
37.) She thereafter filed a motion to suppress the State's evidence, alleging that the 
stop itself, and all of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, were the result of a 
violation of her constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, and Article I,§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.54-55.) 
At the hearing on Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress, the State called Deputy Matt 
Lovell to testify. (Tr., p.5, Ls.9-19.) Deputy Lovell was the officer who pulled Ms. Lewis 
over on the night of the charged offense. (Tr., p.8, Ls.2-22.) According to his 
testimony, he was following Ms. Lewis' car because he had observed her weaving 
within her own lane of travel on the road, and then saw her pull her car off to the side of 
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the road. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-9.) The officer then stopped his car behind Ms. Lewis to 
execute what he characterized as, "a welfare check on the subjects." (Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.) 
As Deputy Lovell got out of his vehicle, he saw Ms. Lewis extend her arm out of 
the window of the car. (Tr., p.12, Ls.13-18.) Ms. Lewis also turned on her turn signal 
and pulled back onto the road. (Tr., p.13, Ls.1-3.) The deputy got back into his car and 
followed Ms. Lewis based upon his belief that it was "not that typical" for a vehicle to 
temporarily pull over to the side of the road. (Tr., p.14, Ls.10-16.) At that time, the 
officer did not stop Ms. Lewis' vehicle, but merely continued to follow her down the road. 
(Tr., p.14, L.24 - p.15, L.6.) 
According to the deputy, he saw Ms. Lewis' car cross very slightly over the fog 
line on the road - and that her tire only crossed this line by "maybe an inch." (Tr., p.15, 
Ls.7-25.) At a later point, her tire actually went across the fog line. (Tr., p.16, Ls.1-25.) 
Deputy Lovell then initiated a traffic stop. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-3.) During the officer's 
testimony, the State also played a video recording of the traffic stop. (Tr., p.20, L.17 -
p.27, L.6.) This video recording did not clearly show how far Ms. Lewis' vehicle crossed 
the fog line on the road. (State's Exhibit 1.) However, the officer tried to explain this 
fact away by stating that the glare off of his windshield prevented the camera from being 
able to capture Ms. Lewis' position on the road, and that his eyesight was better at 
discerning her car's position. (Tr., p.25, L.7 - p.27, L.6.) 
On cross-examination, Deputy Lovell admitted that it was fairly common for 
drivers - during warm, summer nights such as the one on which Ms. Lewis was stopped 
- to extend their hands or arms out of their windows, and that he had done so himself in 
the past. (Tr., p.39, L.13 - p.40, L.12.) He also admitted that it was commonplace for 
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drivers who are intending to make a right-hand turn to drift slightly to that direction in 
their lane of travel prior to the turn. (Tr., p.40, Ls.17-24.) 
Deputy Lovell further testified that he never saw Ms. Lewis exceeding the posted 
speed limit, either before she initially turned off the road or during his subsequent 
observation of Ms. Lewis' car while he was following her. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-14.) 
Ms. Lewis' registration for the car was current, none of the required equipment on the 
car appeared to be malfunctioning, none of her windows were obstructed or too 
darkened, and the officer did not observe any suspicious movement within her car. 
(Tr., p.48, L.15 - p.50, L.21.) The road on which Ms. Lewis was driving before being 
pulled over had curves and bends at the points where the officer saw her car allegedly 
skirt onto the fog line, and further had deformities in the road's surface that Deputy 
Lovell testified could affect a person's ability to drive. (Tr., p.47, L.20 - p.48, L.5.) None 
of the identified instances of Ms. Lewis' car moving onto the fog line were abrupt or 
jerking swerves to the left or to the right. (Tr., p.47, L.15 - p.48, L. 11.) When Ms. Lewis 
had re-entered traffic after pulling over briefly, she did so after signaling appropriately 
with the turn signal lights on her car. (Tr., p.53, Ls.15-17.) She did not spin her tires or 
in any other way indicate that she was attempting to flee from the officer when she re-
entered traffic prior to later being pulled over. (Tr., p.53, Ls.18-23.) 
Deputy Lovell was the sole witness for the State at this hearing. At the close of 
his testimony, the district court invited the parties to submit briefing regarding the 
suppression motion - and, in particular, to submit briefing as to whether there was a 
lawful basis to stop Ms. Lewis' car based upon her having stuck her arm out of her car 
window and having crossed the fog line. (Tr., p.65, L.14 - p.66, L.15.) 
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Following the hearing on her motion to suppress, Ms. Lewis filed a brief and 
memorandum of authorities with the district court in support of her suppression motion. 
(R., pp.62-79.) In this brief, Ms. Lewis asserted that the officer who initiated the traffic 
stop lacked either probable cause or reasonable, articulable suspicion to do so. 
(R., pp.69-78.) This is because, according to Ms. Lewis, none of the bases set forth by 
Deputy Lovell provided a basis to believe that any traffic laws were actually violated, nor 
did they, in the aggregate, show any impaired driving. (R., pp.69-78.) 
The district court denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress. (R., pp.88-95.) Among 
the bases for the court doing so was the court's conclusion quoting directly from case 
law - that the act of crossing onto or over the fog line on a roadway constitutes a traffic 
offense. The district court reasoned that, because Deputy Lovell had actually witnessed 
Ms. Lewis commit a traffic offense, he had reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop her 
vehicle. (R., pp.92-93.) In light of this fact, and under the totality of the circumstances 
known to Deputy Lovell at the time of the stop, the district court denied Ms. Lewis' 
motion to suppress. (R., p.95.) 
Thereafter, Ms. Lewis entered into a conditional guilty plea to felony driving under 
the influence, specifically reserving the right to challenge on appeal the denial of her 
motion to suppress. (Tr., p.68, L.4 - p.81, L.13; R., pp.99-104, 109.) She was 
sentenced to six years, with three years fixed, based upon her guilty plea. (Tr., p.93, 
Ls.9-14; R., pp.111-114.) Ms. Lewis then filed a timely Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion 
seeking a reduction of her sentence. (Tr., p.96, L.4 - p.98, L.7; R., pp.117-120.) The 
district court did modify her sentence pursuant to this motion, reducing the fixed portion 
of her sentence to two years, with four years indeterminate. (Tr., p.97, L.11 - p.98, L.4.) 
Ms. Lewis timely appeals from her judgment of conviction and sentence. (R., p.122.) 
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ISSUE 
Mindful of the fact that crossing over or onto the fog line on a roadway constitutes a 
traffic infraction, did the district court err when it denied Ms. Lewis' motion to suppress 
the State's evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mindful Of The Fact That Crossing The Fog Line On A Roadway Constitutes A Traffic 
Infraction, Ms. Lewis Nevertheless Asserts That The District Court Erred When It 
Denied Ms. Lewis' Motion To Suppress The State's Evidence 
Ms. Lewis' sole challenge in her motion to suppress the State's evidence was to 
whether there was sufficient legal justification to support Ms. Lewis' detention by Deputy 
Lovell when he pulled her over. (Tr., p.18, L.1 - p.20, L.7.) Among the bases upon 
which the district court determined that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
support the initial stop of Ms. Lewis' car for a traffic violation was evidence presented 
through Deputy Lovell's testimony that her car crossed onto and over the fog line on the 
roadway several times. (R., pp.92-93.) 
The Fourth Amendment permits limited detentions of individuals, such as those 
which occur during a traffic stop, if the officer who seizes the individual possesses 
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime. See, e.g., State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 298 (Ct. App. 2001 ). In the context of 
a traffic stop, this standard amounts to whether, based upon the totality of the 
circumstances at the time of the stop, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion 
that the traffic laws were being violated. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 134 Idaho 552, 
554 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously addressed the question of whether 
even a fleeting crossing of the fog line constitutes a traffic violation that would support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop in Slater. 
Idaho Code§ 49-630(1) requires that a vehicle be driven on the right half 
of the roadway, except in certain circumstances that are not applicable in 
this case. The "roadway" means that portion of a highway that is 
"improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel." It does not 
include "sidewalks, shoulders, berms [or] rights-of-way." Accordingly, 
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when Officer Burns observed Slater's tires cross the fog line, albeit 
fleetingly, Burns now possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion that 
Slater had violated I.C. § 49-630 by driving on the shoulder of the 
highway, rather than on the "roadway." 
Slater, 136 Idaho at 298 (internal citations omitted); see also Anderson, 134 Idaho at 
554-555 (holding the same). 
Mindful of the fact that Ms. Lewis' sole challenge in her motion to suppress was 
to the lawfulness of Deputy Lovell's act of stopping her vehicle upon observing her 
veering onto and over the fog line several times while driving, and mindful of the fact 
that the act of crossing onto or over the fog line is a traffic violation, Ms. Lewis 
nevertheless asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her 
motion to suppress the State's evidence in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Lewis respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction 
and sentence, and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 1ih day of November, 2011. 
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